Mr. Citro was employed at the General Electric facility in Hooksett. He appeared for work on a Saturday morning, although he had been instructed by a supervisor not to return until Monday morning. When he did not immediately leave, the facility security officers called the police. A Hooksett officer responded, but Mr. Citro had already left the premises. The officer had dealt with Mr. Citro on previous occasions, and went to his home to speak with him. While at his home, Mr. Citro agreed not to return to the facility. Despite this agreement, about two hours later, Mr. Citro did return to the GE facility, and the police were contacted again. The same officer responded again, as did his superior officer. Both officers interviewed Mr. Citro, and while finding that he had difficulty understanding the situation, they determined that he could not be detained. About two hours later, Mr. Citro was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, which caused the injuries to the plaintiff.
“Immunity” provides a complete protection from liability, and might mean that an injured person would have no chance to recover damages for the injury from anyone. While this may seem fundamentally unfair, as a matter of public policy this risk of loss to the individual is compared to the risk that a police officer might make a public safety decision based upon a fear of personal liability, rather than upon the public good.
As the court stated, “Today we decide that encouraging independent police judgment for the protection and welfare of the citizenry at large must prevail over ensuring common law civil recourse for individuals who may be injured by errant police decisions. We hold that municipal police officers are immune from personal liability for decisions, acts, or omissions that are: (1) made within the scope of their official duties while in the course of their employment; (2) discretionary, rather than ministerial; and (3) not made in a wanton or reckless manner.”
While this opinion expands the immunity protections against personal liability enjoyed by individual police officers, the court did not expand the liability protection for the municipality as employer. The town argued that it should enjoy “discretionary function immunity” from the officers’ decision in this case, but the court refused to afford this protection. It found that their actions did not involve the process of governing the municipality, and that no public policy justified protecting the entire municipality from a lawsuit.
The town also argued that if the individual officers were immune from suit, it should be afforded “vicarious immunity” as the employer. The Supreme Court remanded this issue to trial court, to be adjudicated based upon the facts of the case. The court stated that this type of immunity protection would be appropriate if the risk of liability would cause municipal managers to focus “stifling attention” upon the individual officer, and thus deter the officer from effective performance of the duties in question. Thus, it is possible, but by no means certain, that the municipal employer could escape liability in this specific case, but in the future no municipality will automatically be granted immunity from suit based solely upon the “official immunity” of its individual employees.
This case is complex, and its precise meaning will be debated and litigated in the context of future cases where innocent parties are injured by the negligent or intentional actions of persons who have recently been in contact with the police. The court has provided substantial protection to individual officers who make discretionary decisions, but refused to insulate their municipal employers from potential liability. The court seems to be encouraging municipalities to continue to improve police training, police procedures and the supervision of individual officers, and to protect itself from the financial consequences of liability by the acquisition of insurance. The court also noted that the legislature was free to enact legislation that would afford relief to individual citizens harmed by the negligent conduct of police officers. Thus, it is not likely that this case will be the last word in the resolution of difficult cases such as here presented.