This case arises out of a decision of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regarding food stamp benefits, but it involves an issue of alleged discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that may be of interest to municipalities.
Kalar is the disabled mother of two disabled sons who has received assistance under the federal Food Stamp Act for several years. Federal regulations permit various deductions from a participant's income in calculating a household budget and food stamp allotment. Certain "excess medical deductions" are allowed for household members who are elderly or disabled. In reviewing Kalar's income and expenses, DHHS disallowed expenses claimed by Kalar as "excess medical deductions" because they were not covered by the regulation; namely private school tuition and school transportation expenses for her sons, expenses incurred for transportation to medical appointments for herself and her sons, cellular telephone service expenses, and expenses related to bowling and other sports activities for her sons. After a fair hearing, Kalar filed a petition for certiorari with the New Hampshire Supreme Court claiming, among other things, that the DHHS decision discriminated against her on the basis of disability. Specifically, she asserted that "[t]he department has refused … to make any modifications to their policies, practices or procedures to make reasonable accommodations to ensure that people with disabilities are able to attain an equal opportunity to benefit from this program."
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
To state a claim under Title II, a person must allege that "(1) [s]he is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of a disability." Citing the U.S. Supreme Court case of Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985), the Court stated that the test is whether Kalar "has been denied meaningful access to the department's food stamp program as a result of the denial of her deduction claims." The Court ruled that Kalar did not meet the test:
She fully participated in the food stamp program, and was given the benefit of allowable excess medical deductions. Moreover, the excess medical deductions provision of the regulations is applicable solely to expenses incurred by elderly or disabled persons, thus belying her claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability…. That the extent of allowable excess medical deductions may be insufficient to meet the petitioner's needs does not amount to a denial of meaningful program access under the ADA…. "It is not required that any benefit extended to one category of individual with a disability also be extended to all other categories of individual with a disability. Thus, any class so excluded is not denied benefits solely on the basis of disability within the meaning of [Title II of the ADA]." … "[T]here is no discrimination under the [ADA] where disabled individuals are given the same opportunity as everyone else." [citations omitted]
Municipal "services, programs and activities" are subject to the ADA, and reasonable accommodations must be made to allow participation by disabled people. However, as this case illustrates, not every rule must be suspended upon request. The focus must be on whether the requested accommodation is necessary to allow participation.